My first reaction on finding this article two years ago was that the author was crazy. But I skimmed through it, and he does have a few points regarding the strategic situation and the timing of the attacks on Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. However, he neglects one very important aspect of why Japan surrendered when it did: the role of the emperor.
The simple fact is, neither the bomb nor the Soviets persuaded the leaders of the Japanese government to surrender. Even after all three events, the militarists were still determined to fight on, even to the destruction of Japan, rather than accept the shame of surrender. At this moment, Emperor Hirohito broke precedence and tradition by ruling instead of reigning and deciding in the name of protecting his subjects to surrender. And even in the face of this ruling by the supreme leader that was seen as a god by the Japanese people, a few hardliners launched a coup to prevent the surrender. Fortunately for Japan and for the allies, the coup failed and Japan surrendered.
Another problem with the article are the use of words like "defeat", "beat" and "win". Even before the bombs were dropped -- and before the Soviet entry into the war -- Japan had been defeated. She had lost the majority of her conquests in the Pacific, and what remained were surrounded and left to rot. The home islands were cut off from what remained of the empire by naval blockade, principally submarines; and her merchant fleet had all but been destroyed. Her cities had been laid waste by firebombing B-29s. The people were homeless and starving. The defeat of Japan was complete, the only thing that remained was to persuade its leaders to surrender, or to wipe the nation from the face of the earth if they refused.
This new appraisal of history began with Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, a highly respected historian at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Here is another article suggesting that it was the Soviet entry in the war rather than the atomic bombings that led Japan to surrender, this time from the Boston Globe in August 2011.
http://archive.boston.com/bostonglob...pan_surrender/
Hasegawa - who was born in Japan and has taught in the United States since 1990, and who reads English, Japanese, and Russian - rejects both the traditional and revisionist positions. According to his close examination of the evidence, Japan was not poised to surrender before Hiroshima, as the revisionists argued, nor was it ready to give in immediately after the atomic bomb, as traditionalists have always seen it. In the face of these two facts, which I entirely agree with, Hasagawa appears to leap onto the third significant event of that one week in August 1945, the Soviet entry into the war. The thinking appears to be, if Japan was not ready to surrender, and the bombs didn't change that, then it must have been the Soviet offensive in Manchuria.
However, as I noted in response to the FP article above, the Soviet entry into the war also did not change the mind of the generals and militarist hardliners who remained determined to fight to the death, and to the utter destruction of Japan. The only person to change, in the face of all three events was the emperor, and how can we really say it was only one, the bombs, or the other, the Soviet offensive that persuaded him? I have been arguing for years, since at least 1995, that the bombs did not force Japan to surrender, nor was it the Soviet entry into the war. Rather, these events gave the emperor the moment to step forward and end the war, to rule instead of reign. By doing so he broke tradition, and the significant events, not just of August, but of 1944-45, made that possible.
A faction within the Japanese government was trying to get the Soviets to mediate a peace deal, but they were doing this secretly because the majority of the government was opposed to any peace deal. Naturally, the entry of the Soviets in the war on August 8, removed even the slim hope of a peace mediated by them. What the Japanese did not know was that the Soviets had no intention of mediating between Japan and the allies, but was promising to enter the war against the Japanese. The bombings, as well as the Soviet offensive in Manchuria, certainly clinched it for the peace faction, but the rest of the government remained determined to fight on.
During the early hours of August 10, only hours after the second bomb fell on Nagasaki, an Imperial Council was held because the prime minister and his cabinet were deadlocked and unable to reach a decision on whether to surrender or fight on. So this is after the bombings and after the Soviet entry into the war, and yet the cabinet remained deadlocked between the hardliners and the peace faction. Each of the six cabinet members in the imperial council made a statement to the emperor. General Anami, the War Minister, pleaded for a last decisive battle in the Homeland. "I am quite sure we could inflict great casualties on the enemy, and even if we fail in the attempt, our hundred million people are ready to die for honor, glorifying the deeds of the Japanese race in recorded history!"
If it was truly the Soviet entry into the war, instead of the bombs, then what is the reason for this deadlock two days after the Soviet offensive in Manchuria began? By the way, early reports from Manchuria must have signaled that things were going very badly for the Kwantung Army, yet General Anami and others continued to argue for that last decisive battle. It was at this point that the emperor stepped forward into history.
When the ministers were finished with their statements the Prime Minister then asked the Emperor to express his wishes. Audible gasps were heard in the room; the very question was unprecedented. The Emperor rose and began to speak, "I have given serious thought to the situation prevailing at home and abroad and have concluded that continuing the war means destruction for the nation and a prolongation of bloodshed and cruelty in the world. I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. Ending the war is the only way to restore world peace and to relieve the nation from the terrible distress with which it is burdened." When he finished only the sobs of a few ministers could be heard.
The cabinet was no longer deadlocked, the emperor had decided. But there were still hardliners in the army that continued to refuse to surrender, and some of them launched a coup. The word went out that the emperor was recording a message to be played on Japanese radio, and a handful of army officers broke into the imperial palace to try and find the recording, in order to prevent it from being broadcast to the people. The coup failed. Another group launched a second coup, attempting to capture the emperor, but it also failed. On August 14, the recording was broadcast, and Japan surrendered.
"The Emperor alone did something he had been taught never to do," argues historian Edwin P. Hoyt. "For one moment in history he ruled rather than reigned. The result was the salvation of Japan."