On the Allied Bombing of Germany
Vast resources of men, aircraft, flak guns and money were diverted from use on the Eastern Front to battling Allied daylight and night raids.
Feb. 25, 2014 4:10 p.m. ET
Adam Tooze's review of Richard Overy's "The Bombers and the Bombed" (Books, Feb. 15) might have mentioned a crucial factor in favor of the Allied bombing campaign. The bomber offensive by the Royal Air Force and the U.S. 8th Air Force was, at least during its early period, the closest the Allies could come to opening a second front in Europe to relieve pressure on the Soviet Union.
Even if German production levels weren't as badly affected initially by air raids as hoped in London and Washington, nothing stung the Nazis like the bombing of the Fatherland. So vast resources of men, aircraft, flak guns and money were diverted from use on the Eastern Front to battling Allied day and night raids. The financial costs associated with antiaircraft defense were substantial. For instance, in January 1943—at a time when Germany struggled to regain the strategic initiative in the East and faced an increasingly heavy bombing campaign in the West—expenditures on antiaircraft defenses were almost 30% of the budget for weapons and munitions production.
If most of the resources that had to be lavished on the air defense of Germany had been able to be sent to fighting the Soviet Union, the outcome on the Eastern Front, could have been different.
The terrible losses sustained by the courageous men of the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.A.F. were not in vain.
Ian Lyness
Lafayette, Colo.